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I) Introduction 
 
“Analytically, franchising is a way to allocate decisions within the franchise system 
between the franchisor and the franchisee in order to promote efficiency and provide 
incentives.”1 This statement of Michael (1996) depicts that franchising is an 
instrument for allocating decision rights. Commonly franchisees take decisions in the 
local operations areas, such as hours, prices, and locations, because they have the 
specific knowledge about local trading conditions.2 Franchisors usually make 
decisions regarding the product, its production, and associated marketing efforts that 
create standardization in order to maintain the value of the trademark.3 But this 
allocation varies within the different franchise networks with regard to contents and it 
is carried out gradually.  
Although agency theory is probably the theory which is used the most toy to examine 
franchising, relatively few agency-theorists have focused on the allocation of decision 
rights. It seems that especially from the perspective of property rights empirical 
research on this topic has been done (e.g. Windsperger (2004)). The purpose of this 
paper is to explain the allocation of decision rights in franchising networks from an 
agency-theoretical point of view and thus to fill this gap. In the field of centralization of 
decision rights in franchising, agency theory focuses on the threat of free-riding, 
monitoring costs4 and the amount of royalties. The aim is to answer the questions: 1) 
If franchisors tend to grant the franchisees more decision rights in order to motivate 
them to induce effort in an environment of high behavioral uncertainty (where 
monitoring costs are high).  2) If franchisors tend to centralize decision rights in order 
to protect the value of the brand name when the franchise network has a good 
reputation, because high value-brand names evoke the threat of franchisees’ free-
riding.5 3) If franchisors tend to centralize the decision rights in the network when 
they parallel charge high royalties from the franchisees as a sign for a very 
centralized system that gets close to company ownership.6 
 
                                                 
1
 Michael (1996:57). 
2
cf. Michael (1996:57); Windsperger (2004:1362). 
3
cf. Michael (1996:57). 
4
cf. Mumdziev, Windsperger (2011:460). 
5
cf. Azevedo (2009). 
6
cf. Lafontaine et al. (1992:274). 
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The first part is devoted to the topic of franchising and decision rights in general. The 
second part depicts franchising from an agency perspective. The third part contains 
the theory of the allocation of decision rights in franchising networks from an agency 
point of view and includes the 3 hypotheses. Part four provides the empirical analysis 
of the stated hypothesis and the discussion of the results. Specifically, in the 
empirical studies we observe on the basis of data from the Austrian, Swiss and the 
German franchise-sector, the influence of the brand name value (measure for the 
probability of free-riding7), the amount of royalties, and behavioral uncertainty (that 
escalates monitoring costs8) on the allocation of decision rights in franchising 
networks.  
 
 
 
A) Franchising and Decision Rights 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the topics of franchising and decision rights and 
the allocation of decision rights in general. 
 
 
 
A.1 Franchising: An Overview 
 
The driving factor for the use of franchising as a business method is the achievement 
of operational efficiency.9  The advantage of franchising is that it permits economies 
of scale through system wide standardization in the areas of marketing, purchasing, 
and product development.10  It also allows profiting from the expertise and 
responsiveness of small-scale entrepreneurs (franchisees) to adapt to local 
markets.11 Additionally the franchisees are more motivated to create profits since 
                                                 
7
 Azevedo (2009). 
8
 Lafontaine et al. (1998:20). 
9
 Dnes (1996:321). 
10
 cf. Cochet et al. (2008:50); Dormann et al.(2006:3);Michael (1996:60) 
11
 cf. ibid. 
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residual claimants have higher-powered incentives than salaried outlet managers and 
thus.12 
 
 
 
A.1.1 The Franchise Contract 
 
With the franchise contract a franchisor sells the right to use the franchise-networks 
brand name, operating methods and product specifications to the franchisee.13 The 
franchisee in return, pays franchise fees as well as advertising fees and royalties14 
for the right to offer the franchise products or services within a specified region and 
time period15. 
 
Royalties establish a linkage between the success of the franchisee and the 
franchisor16. They form a percentage of gross sales (typically 5%), to compensate the 
franchisors for the franchisees’ use of the trademark and associated services17 (e.g.  
training services) 18. The royalty rate also acts as a compensation for periodic quality 
inspections.19  
 
The franchise fee is a one-time upfront fee the franchisee pays the franchisor when 
the franchise contract is signed.20 This fee impacts the initial investment and signals 
relative quality to potential franchisees.21 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 cf. Lopez-Fernandez et al. (2011:3);Rubin (1978); Brickley et al. (1991);Shane (1998) 
13
 cf. Cochet et al. (2008:50). 
14
 Royalties are paid only in business format franchising on which this paper focuses. In traditional franchising  
no royalty payments are used. Lafontaine et al. (1992:265) 
15
 Combs et al. (2003:443);Lafontaine et al.(1992);Lafontaine et al.(2007:632) 
16
 cf. Spinelli et al. (1998:47). 
17
 cf. Michael (1996:57). 
18
 cf. Michael et al. (2008:74). 
19
 cf. ibid. 
20
 cf. Spinelli et al. (1998:46). 
21
 cf. ibid. 
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The advertising/marketing fee is a percentage of gross sales (typically 0 to 6 
percent)22 that the franchisee must commit for marketing expenditures.23 The 
advertising fee drives the economies of scale in marketing.24 
 
According to Rubin (1978) franchise contracts can include several standard clauses: 
 
1. The franchisor provides differing sorts of assistance to the franchisee such as site 
selection, training programs, provision of operating manuals, ongoing advice, and 
advertising. The level of assistance varies from industry to industry.25 
 
2. The franchisee agrees to run the business in a manner that suits the franchisor 
and the franchisor may control the franchisees actions regarding products sold, 
inventory, insurance, personnel, accounting, and auditing.26 
 
 
3. In addition to the payment of royalties the franchisee may be compelled to 
purchase inputs from the franchisor or from approved suppliers.27 
 
4. The contract can integrate miscellaneous clauses such as a termination clause 
(whereby the franchisor can terminate the agreement almost at will), the right of the 
franchisee to sell the franchise, and the right to open a cometing business after 
ceasing to be a franchisee.28 
 
 
A.1.2 Vertical Integration 
 
Generally within franchise systems there exist company owned and operated outlets 
besides franchisee owned outlets.29 The number of units owned divided by the total 
                                                 
22
 cf. Michael (2009:2). 
23
 cf. Spinelli et al. (1998:47). 
24
 cf. ibid. 
25
 cf. Rubin (1978:224). 
26
 cf. ibid. 
27
 cf. Rubin (1978:224). 
28
 cf. ibid. 
29
 cf.  Brickley et al. (1991:28) 
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units is called the percentage of vertical integration.30 Company owned outlets are 
vertically integrated while a franchised unit is independent under the law and thus not 
integrated vertically.31 Vertical integration is associated in the literature with concepts 
such as common governance and leadership, joint planning, and centralized decision 
making.32 Because of these centralized aspects we use vertical integration as an 
analogy for centralization of decision rights in part D. (Hypothesis). 
 
Agency theory suggests that under conditions of low monitoring costs company 
owned outlets are more efficient than franchised outlets.33 When monitoring costs 
rise due to behavioral/environmental uncertainty and opportunism, franchise outlets 
are more efficient because of the incentive effects (residual claims) on franchisees.34 
 
 
 
A.2 Decisions and Decision Rights in Franchising  
 
The following chapter focuses on the explanation of decisions and decision rights in 
general and in the case of franchising in particular. 
 
 
 
A.2.1 Decision Rights: An Overview 
 
Jensen et al. (1992) define a decision right as the right to decide on, to take an 
action, the “power” to make decisions and to take actions with regards the 
resources.35  
For efficient decision-making specific knowledge is necessary which is costly or 
difficult to transmit.36  
                                                 
30
 cf. Michael (1996:58); Brickley et al. (2003:357); Norton (1988:107) 
31
 cf. Lafontaine et al. (2007:632) 
32
 cf. Feng, Hendrikse (2008:20) 
33
 cf. Windsperger, Dant (2006:261) 
34
 cf. Windsperger, Dant (2006:261)
 
;Lopez-Fernandez et al. (2011:3) 
35
 cf. Jensen et al. (1992:9). 
36
 cf. Windsperger (2004:1362). 
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The crucial point is that the person with the specific knowledge should have the right 
to decide on providing efficiency.37 This collocation of decision rights is possible by 
transferring the specific knowledge to the person who has the decision right or by 
transferring the decision right to the person with the specific knowledge.38 
The principal as the owner of the decision rights has to delegate (decentralize) 
specific decision rights due to lack of specific or tacit39 knowledge:40 “Due to the 
CEO’s limited information-processing capabilities organizations must delegate 
decision-making power.”41  
 
With the delegation of decision rights 2 problems arise : 
 
• the rights assignment problem 
• the agency problem42 
 
The rights assignment problem is the difficulty of determining by whom the decision 
right should be exercised.43 
The agency problem is how to ensure weather the opportunistic agent exercises his 
decision rights in a manner satisfying for the principal.44  
 
 
 
A.2.1.2 Formal and Real Authority  
 
Aghion et al.(1997) distinguish between the allocation of formal authority (the right to 
decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions).45 
The determinant of this distinction is also information (specific knowledge): 
                                                 
37
 cf. Jensen et al. (1992:2). 
38
 cf. Windsperger (2004:1362). 
39
 cf. Windsperger (2004:1361). 
40
 cf. Jensen et al. (1992:1). 
41
 Windsperger (2004:1362). 
42
 cf. Jensen et al. (1992:2). 
43
 cf. Jensen et al. (1992:2). 
44
 cf. ibid. 
45
 cf. Aghion et al. (1997:1). 
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“A principal who has formal authority over a decision (or activity) can always reverse 
her subordinate's decision but will refrain from doing so if the subordinate is much 
better informed and if their objectives are not too antinomic.”46 
 
The problem with delegation of formal authority is that there exists a trade-off 
(influenced by the structure of information) between initiative of the agent and a loss 
of control for the principal.47 Thus, authority is more likely to be delegated for 
unimportant decisions and decisions the agent can be trusted with.48 
 
 
 
A.2.2 Decision Rights in Franchising 
 
Within a franchise system specific decisions are divided between the franchisor and 
the franchisee and the appropriate level of residual claims is allocated to each of 
them.49 Decision rights can be incorporated in the franchise manual or in contractual 
clauses and can prescribe a large number of detailed tasks the franchisees must 
perform in each outlet.50 
 
Typical decision rights in franchising networks include the procurement decision, 
pricing and product decisions, advertising decision, human resource decisions 
(recruitment and training), investment and finance decisions, and decisions 
concerning accounting systems.51 
 
The franchisor usually makes decisions on key issues such as product, production, 
and associated marketing efforts in order to maintain standardization that signals the 
trademark.52 With specific knowledge about the local market conditions the 
franchisee is capable to make decisions “regarding local operating policies such as 
                                                 
46
 cf. Aghion et al. (1997:2). 
47
 cf. Aghion et al. (1997:27). 
48
 cf. ibid. 
49
 cf. Michael (1996:59). 
50
 cf. Lopéz-Fernandez et al. (2011:4). 
51
 Windsperger (2004:1365). 
52
 cf. Michael (1996:57). 
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location, pricing, hours of service, and hiring.”53 In return he bears the residual claims 
of these decisions – the outlet’s net profit after expenses (royalty payments).54 These 
residual claims act as an incentive for the franchisee to operate the unit efficiently.55 
Thus the franchisee has more motivation to devote effort than employed outlet 
managers who receive a fixed salary.56 
 
 
 
A.2.3 Franchisee’s autonomy 
 
The allocation of decision rights in franchise chains is an indicator of the degree of 
the franchisees’ autonomy and a basic control mechanism to maintain uniformity 
across the units.57  Through allocating decision rights the franchisor can vary the 
level of autonomy of the franchisee in order to achieve the required standardization 
level.58  There exist four basic structural sources of franchisees’ autonomy: allocation 
of contractual rights, contractual incompleteness, control costs and limited monitoring 
capacities, and direct acceptance of deviant franchisee behavior by the franchisor.59    
 
Contractual rights are often standardized within a network and detailed in handbooks 
(because of legal costs, concerns of equity and franchisor moral hazard) and restrict 
the franchisees’ decision rights.60 
 
Contractual incompleteness as a result of bounded rationality, unforeseeable 
contingencies, writing costs and difficulties of verification through third-party 
enforcers means that franchise contracts do not completely specify the obligations of 
the two parties.61 
 
                                                 
53
 cf. Michael (1996:59). 
54
 cf. ibid. 
55
 cf. Michael (1996:57). 
56
 cf. Cochet (2005:61). 
57
 cf. Lopéz et al. (2011:4). 
58
 cf. ibid. 
59
 cf. Cochet (2005:60). 
60
 cf. ibid. 
61
 cf. Cochet (2005:61). 
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Control costs and limited control capacities of the systems’ head offices lead to a 
substantial amount of de facto autonomy of the outlets.62 
 
Direct acceptance of deviant franchisee behavior by the franchisor can occur if 
beneficial outcomes for the whole channel are expected.63 A franchisee, for example 
who is expected to behave very appropriately is less monitored than other 
franchisees and thus he enjoys more operating autonomy.64 
 
 
 
B) Agency Theory and Franchising 
 
B.1 Agency Theory: An Overview 
 
The origin of the agency theory lies in the 1960s and early 1970s when economists 
explored risk sharing among individuals or groups.65 This risk sharing problem has 
been described as something that arises when cooperating parties have different 
attitudes toward risk.66  Agency theory added to this risk sharing literature the agency 
problem 67 which deals with the principal-agent relationship.68 
 
In principal-agent relationships the agent is called upon to act on behalf of the 
principal,69 which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.70 
Some examples for such relationships are the relationship between the shareholders 
of a company and it’s CEO (the shareholders act as principal who delegate the CEO 
as agent to maximize their shares), the CEO and the key account manager (the CEO 
as principal and the key account manager as agent, or the franchisor as principal 
who delegates the franchisee as agent.  
                                                 
62
 cf. ibid. 
63
 cf. ibid. 
64
 cf. ibid. 
65
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:58). 
66
 cf. ibid. 
67
 cf. ibid. 
68
 cf. ibid. 
69
 cf. Milgrom et al.(1992:167). 
70
 cf. Jensen et al.(1976:5). 
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The agents’ and principals’ interests regularly differ.71 If both parties are utility 
maximizers, it is not a given that the agent acts in the best manner for the principal72. 
Furthermore it is not possible (at zero cost) 73 for the principal to evaluate how well 
the agent has worked or if he has been honest.74 
 
 
 
B.1.1 Agency Problems: The Key Assumptions 
 
The important key-assumptions concerning agency theory are self interest, bounded 
rationality, risk aversion, goal conflict, efficiency as the effectiveness criterion, 
information asymmetry and information as a purchasable commodity.75 These key-
assumptions are the basis for the miscellaneous agency problems and potential 
remedies against them. 
 
 
 
B.1.1.1 Self Interest/Opportunism 
 
Self interest/ opportunism (e.g. blame, impression management, lying, etc.)76 is 
differentiated into pre- and postcontractual opportunism.  
 
Precontractual opportunism is opportunistic behaviour on the part of the principal or 
the agent that takes place before a contract is signed.77 An example for this would be 
adverse selection which arises when an agent cheats about his abilities (he may 
claim to have certain skills or abilities) before the contract is signed.78  
 
                                                 
71
 cf. Milgrom et al.(1992:167). 
72
 cf. Jensen et al.(1976:5). 
73
 cf. ibid. 
74
 cf. Milgrom et al.(1992:167). 
75
 cf. Eisenhardt(1989:59). 
76
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:59). 
77
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:602). 
78
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:61); Pizanti et al. (2003) 
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Postcontractual opportunism is opportunistic behaviour that takes place after the 
contract is signed.79 Examples for postcontractual opportunism are moral hazard and 
the hold-up problem.  
 
Moral hazard arises from different interests of the contracting parties and non 
observability.80  It refers to the lack of agreed effort on the part of the agent, in other 
words: the agent is shirking.81   
 
Hold up is the problem in which a party to a contract is forced to accept 
disadvantageous terms after it has invested.82  
 
 
 
B.1.1.2 Bounded rationality 
 
Bounded rationality defines the fact that people act in an intentionally rational 
manner83  but that they are not able to foresee all relevant factors that would be 
relevant.84 Particularly, it is not possible for them to solve complex problems exactly, 
free of cost and instant, and their communication is imperfect.85  
 
 
 
B.1.1.3 Risk aversion 
 
The simple principal-agent model assumes that the agent is more risk-averse than 
the principal (who is risk neutral) because it’s not possible for the agent to diversify 
his employment while the principal is capable to diversifying his investments.86 That 
means the reason why the principal is seen as risk neutral derives from the 
                                                 
79
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:602). 
80
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:195). 
81
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:61). 
82
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:136); Klein (1996:445) 
83
 cf. Milgrom et al.(1992:130). 
84
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:129). 
85
 cf. Milgrom et al .(1992:130).     
86
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:60). 
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assumption that he is better financed than the agent and thus able to bear risk 
better.87   
 
The agent would rather have a smaller fixed income than an uncertain income that is 
somewhat larger on average but is subject to unpredictable and uncontrollable 
variability.88 Here arises the problem of risk-sharing because the principal and the 
agent have different risk preferences and therefore may prefer to choose different 
actions.89  The point here is that the risk-neutral principal is interested in the 
maximization of his revenues while the risk-averse agent wants to maximize his 
utility.90 Thus the agent has to be paid more on average by the principal to convince 
him to accept bearing these risks.91 From the point of view of the principal this extra 
income of the agent is a considered to be a cost for the incentive payment (agency 
cost).92 
 
 
B.1.1.4 Goal conflicts 
 
 Agency theory declares that a goal conflict is inherent when individuals with differing 
preferences engage in a cooperative effort.93   In agency theory goal conflicts are 
resolved through the coalignment of incentives.94 An appropriately designed reward 
system causes the self interested behaviour of the agent to approximate the 
behaviour desired by the principal.95  
 
 
 
B.1.1.5 Efficiency as an effectiveness criterion 
 
                                                 
87
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:187). 
88
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:187). 
89
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:58). 
90
 cf. Pfaff et al. (1998:187). 
91
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:187).   
92
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:187).     
93
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:63). 
94
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:63). 
95
 cf. Milgrom et al.(1992:187).   
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If the parties bargain effectively and can implement and enforce their decisions, then 
the outcomes of economic activity will tend to be efficient.96  
 
 
B.1.1.6 Information asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry results because the individual actions of the agent cannot be 
observed exactly.97 Limited information processing capability, limited knowledge and 
a lack of time force the principal to delegate decisions to the agent.98 That means the 
asymmetrical information allocation between the principal and the agent leads to the 
danger of conflicts because the agent could use his ledge of information in an 
opportunistic manner. 
 
Three types of problems can be distinguished concerning the origins of this 
information asymmetry between principal and agent:99 
 
• Hidden action  
• Hidden information  
• Hidden characteristics.  
 
Hidden action defines the problem where the principal cannot (or cost free) observe 
the actions of the agent, and distinguish the agents’ level of effort from the results of 
the agents’ efforts because the results are significantly dependent on random 
circumstances.100 
 
Hidden information describes the case in which the agents efforts could probably be 
observed but the principal is not able to evaluate them because of a lack of expert 
knowledge. 101 
 
                                                 
96
 cf. Milgrom et al. (1992:24).   
97
 cf. Holmström (1979:74).   
98
 cf. Pfaff et al. (1998:184). 
99
 cf. Picot (1991:150). 
100
 cf. Picot (1991:151). 
101
 cf. ibid. 
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Hidden characteristics are the quality characteristics of the agent which are important 
for the principal (e.g. abilities, credibility, etc.) that are not known a priori and which 
could lead to adverse selection.102 
 
 
 
B.1.1.7 Information as a purchasable commodity 
 
 “In agency theory, information is regarded as a commodity: It has a cost, and it can 
be purchased.”103 In other words, the principal is able to invest in information systems 
in order to control the agent’s opportunism.104 These investments are referred to as 
monitoring costs. 
 
 
 
B.1.2 Agency Costs 
 
The focus of the agency theory lies in the determination of the most efficient contract  
governing the principal-agent relationship.105 This contract deals with tasks like 
people (e.g. self interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organizations (e.g. goal 
conflict among members) and information (e.g. information is a commodity which can 
be purchased).106  The aim of the contract is to minimize the agency costs. According 
to Jensen et al. (1976) this agency costs consist of  
 
• the monitoring expenditures of the principal 
• the bonding expenditures of the agent  
• the residual loss.107   
 
                                                 
102
 cf. ibid. 
103
 Eisenhardt (1989:64). 
104
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:64). 
105
 cf. Eisenhardt (1989:58). 
106
 cf. ibid. 
107
 cf. Jensen et al. (1976:5). 
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There is a trade-off relationship between these 3 components which never has a 
negative value.108  Residual loss for example can be reduced trough greater 
monitoring expenditures while monitoring expenditures can be reduced through 
bonding expenditures on the part of the agent.109 
 
 
 
B.1.2.1 Monitoring Costs 
 
It is generally impossible for the principal at zero cost to ensure that the agent will 
make optimal decisions from the principal’s point of view.110  The costs that arise 
here are the monitoring expenditures. Monitoring is used to evaluate or view the 
agents’ fulfilment of the contract by the principal.111 It can be used to punish social 
inefficient behaviour, for example one could reduce the payment of employees who 
come late or stop work earlier or in order to reward good behavior. 112 It also includes 
efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through 
budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.113   
 
 
 
B.1.2.2 Bonding Costs 
 
Bonding expenditures on the part of the agent arise for example when the principal 
requires a guarantee sum from the agent in order to induce a good performance.114 
This bond is forfeited if inappropriate behaviour on the part of the agent is 
detected.115  A problem could arise during bonding is that the agent may lack 
monetary resources in order to provide a sufficiently large bond 116 The bonding 
                                                 
108
 cf. Picot (1991:151). 
109
 cf. Picot (1991:150). 
110
 cf. Jensen et al.(1976:5). 
111
 cf. ibid. 
112
 cf. Milgrom et al.(1992:186). 
113
 cf. Jensen et al.(1976:6). 
114
 cf. Milgrom et al.(1992:189). 
115
 cf. ibid. 
116
 cf. ibid. 
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expenditures of the agent can be seen as principals’ expenditures because in fact the 
principal remunerates the effort of the agent.117  
 
 
 
B.1.2.3 Residual Loss 
 
The monetary equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a 
result of the divergence between the agents’ decisions and the decisions which 
would maximize the welfare of the principal is called the residual loss.118   
  
 
 
B.2 Agency Theory and Franchising 
 
“It appears that one major advantage of a franchise is the information it provides to 
consumers: when I take my family to a McDonald's I know what to expect, no matter 
where it is located. Thus, it would be worthwhile for McDonald's to spend a fair sum 
to maintain this situation and to curtail any local variation.”119 
 
Within franchising networks franchisors act as principals, who delegate authority to 
outlet level agents – either to employee managers or franchisees.120  
 
The goals of the principal in franchising networks include maintaining uniformity and 
accomplishing system wide adaption. 121 Maintaining uniformity is important to fulfil 
the expectations of the customers while system wide adaption is necessary for 
survival in industry competition.122 “These two challenges interact with each other: as 
new opportunities and threats arise, the pressures for changing the system grow; and 
                                                 
117
 cf. Sharma (1997:762). 
118
 cf. Jensen et al. (1976:5). 
119
 Rubin (1978:230). 
120
 cf. Combs et al. (2003:446). 
121
 cf. Bradach (1997:282);Rubin(1978) 
122
 cf. Bradach (1997:282). 
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as those pressures grow and innovative ideas emerge, the issue then becomes how 
to get the system to adopt a new uniform standard.” 123  
 
The goal of the franchisee is to maximize the net income of the outlet because his 
compensation varies in direct relationship with the income of the outlet.124  Thus, he 
has an incentive to manage the outlets variable costs tightly.125 
 
The goal of an outlet manager in a company owned outlet is to receive his fixed 
salary and to maximize his utility-function which is independent of the outlet’s 
performance.126 Therefore (from principal’s point of view) he has no powerful 
incentive to perform efficiently.127   
 
 
 
B.2.1 Agency Problems in Franchising Networks 
 
“The franchise relationship presents a potential for conflict between franchisor and 
franchisee in that the franchisor seeks standardization and control of franchisees so 
as to maintain brand reputation whereas franchisees strive for autonomy in operating 
their own entrepreneurial ventures.” 128 
 
Agency problems are subdivided into vertical and horizontal agency problems.129 
Vertical agency problems occur when salaried outlet managers shirk and reduce 
efforts while horizontal agency problems arise when non-company owner agents like 
franchisees gain benefits while damaging the brand name (free-riding).130 
.  
The differing goals of franchisor and franchisee/outlet manager combined with 
conditions of uncertainty, incomplete information and opportunism create the three 
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major agency problems in the management of organizational design in a franchising 
network131 :  
 
1. Moral hazard  
2. Adverse selection  
3. The hold-up problem.132 
 
 
 
B.2.1.1 Moral Hazard in Franchising Networks 
 
The difficulty for principals to view agent’s level of effort leads to the problem of moral 
hazard.133  In franchising this problem consists out of three particular issues: 
 
• Shirking 
• Free-riding  
• Inefficient investment134 
 
 
 
B.2.1.1.1 Shirking and free-riding 
 
Shirking of outlet managers135 arises because of their fixed salary which encourages 
them to deliver reduced effort to maximize their utility.136  
 
Free-riding occurs when a franchisee maximizes his private income opportunistically, 
he “free-rides” on other units by withholding effort or reducing costs while at the same 
time counting on other franchisees to invest in quality in order to maintain the brand 
                                                 
131
 cf. Shane (1998:719). 
132
 cf. Shane (1998:719). 
133
 cf. ibid. 
134
 cf. Carney et al. (1991:609). 
135
  Combs et al. (2004:911)  argue that  franchisees do not shirk (reduce effort) because their income is tied to 
their effort while employee managers will shirk because they do not possess strong ownership 
incentives(residual claims). 
136
 cf. Carney et al. (1991:609). 
23 
 
name of the system.137  Some examples of free-riding include underinvestment in 
advertising, failure to comply with production standards, and insufficient staff 
supervision.138 
 
The common example for the free-rider problem is the ‘superhighway problem’139 in 
which a fast food chain restaurant is located in an area where the probability of a 
repeated sale to a customer is low.140 “Under these circumstances, the franchisee 
may lure customers in on the basis of an established brand name, but deliver an 
inferior quality product or service.” 141 Such behaviour is beneficial to an individual 
franchisee, which does not rely upon repeated customers because the majority of his 
customers are walk-in customers.142 The cost savings from providing lower quality go 
directly to the free-riding franchisee while in the case of franchisees his practice leads 
to a loss in customer patronage and a less valuable trademark to franchise for the 
franchisor:143 “If a franchisee withholds effort and successfully free rides on the 
franchisor's brand name, this may reflect poorly on perceived brand quality and lead 
to poor organizational performance.”144 
 
 
 
B.2.1.1.2 Inefficient investment 
 
Inefficient investment of franchisees arises because they are forced to consider the 
full risk of undertaking any marginal investments145  while the owners of multiple units 
(i.e.: franchisors) only have to consider the systematic risk of a particular 
investment.146 “For example, a franchisee often has the flexibility to implement local 
advertising (billboards, newspaper ads, etc.) and promotion campaigns (e.g., two-for-
one specials). It is easy to envision a situation in which a large local advertising 
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campaign would have a positive net current value from the viewpoint of a diversified 
decision maker (franchisor), but not for the relatively undiversified manager 
(franchisee).” 147 This means that such investments which have spill over effects on 
other system units will not appropriate the full return to the franchisees.148  Thus a 
rational franchisee should be expected to under-invest in certain assets.149 
 
 
 
B.2.1.2 Adverse selection 
 
Adverse selection describes the difficulty to ascertain the agent's (outlet manager or 
franchisee) quality level, abilities and honesty ex ante for the principal150 : “Adverse 
selection occurs when the principal cannot ascertain if the agent accurately 
represents his ability to do the work for which he is being paid.”151 The principal bears 
the risk of choosing an inadequate agent before the contract is signed. For example 
the right franchisee to own and operate a single store may be not the right person to 
operate two or more stores.152  
 
 
 
B.2.1.3 The hold-up problem 
 
Hold-up deals with the problem that at least one party could act opportunistically to 
alter an agreement after a relationship-specific investment has been made.153 For 
example, if a franchisor purchases a building that is the symbol of the franchise and 
leases it to the franchisee, the franchisee could refuse to pay the agreed-upon lease 
payment and offer to pay a lower fee, the franchisor would find it in his interest to 
accept this offer, if the costs of enforcing the contract are larger than the benefits.154  
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When the investment is made the owner wants to uphold the value of the trademark 
because the salvage value of the asset is low. 155 
 
 
 
B.2.2 Agency costs in Franchising 
 
“The franchisor has two possibilities to reduce the agency costs: On the one hand, to 
reduce the residual loss by increasing the monitoring activities and, on the other 
hand, to increase the incentive by allocating a higher fraction of residual income to 
the franchisee.” 156 
 
 
 
B.2.2.1 Monitoring 
 
A primary remedy against shirking of outlet managers and free-riding of franchisees 
is monitoring.157 Monitoring is used by the principal to reward superior performance 
and to control underperformance.158 
 
In restaurant chains for example there exist multiple systems for monitoring the 
performance of outlet managers such as automated management information 
systems (MIS), field audits and mystery shoppers.159 
 
Automated management information systems (MIS) link all company outlets to the 
headquarters where food and labour costs are calculated and analyzed dayly as a 
percentage of sales in a restaurant, region, or division. 160 When numbers vary from 
the plan outlet managers are asked to provide explanations and action plans. 161  
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Field audits focus on quality, service, and cleanliness.162 “The field audit form for 
Hardee’s, for example, included 295 items pertaining to the operation of the 
restaurant and took from two to four hours to complete; the audit was conducted at 
least once a month.” 163 
 
Mystery shoppers are evaluators who make unannounced, anonymous visits to the 
outlets and rate the dining experience from the customer’s perspective. 164  
 
Franchisees are monitored for quality substitution (free-riding) via purchase reports 
and product samples sent to the central headquarters.165 
 
Spinelli et al. (2004) additionally name field support, external service audits, peer 
review, analytical tools and customer feedback as instruments to monitor 
franchisees.166 
 
Field support personnel act as liaison between franchisor and franchisee whose 
function is similar to that of district or regional managers in non-franchise companies 
but with less authority.167 These representatives evaluate franchisees, identify 
potential problems, and evaluate necessary corrective actions.168 Field support 
personnel may alternatively have an internal audit function which inspects individual 
store operations using a set of specified criteria. 169 Franchisors operate usually with 
a designed rating system in order to communicate the franchisees how well they 
perform relatively to the company standards.170 If a franchisee regularly falls below 
these standards he allowed some time to improve performance otherwise the 
franchise contract is terminated. 171 Field support staff is most effective when there is 
a high ratio of personnel in relation to the number of franchised stores - on the other 
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side: the greater the number of these personnel the greater is the costs of this 
monitoring instrument.172 
 
External service audits are performed by outside agencies to evaluate franchisee 
operations.173 Because of economies of scale these outside evaluations can be less 
expensive than they would be if performed by the franchisor.174  One example of 
such an external service audit is that of mystery shopping.  
 
Peer reviews are conducted by the franchisees without the participation of the 
franchisor in order to maintain the brand name which is also very important for the 
franchisees.175 The results of these reviews are shared among the franchisees but 
not with the franchisor.176 
 
Analytical Tools: Franchisor performance expectations are based on the performance 
of the franchisor’s own stores and compared with that of the franchisees’.177 For 
example they measure what food and labour costs should calculated as a 
percentage of sales in the fast food industry.178 A store that falls outside the 
parameter of the expectation reports is analyzed in order to determine weather its 
performance is below or above the franchisors expectations.179 If a store is above 
franchisors expectations, for example if it has lower labor costs, the whole franchise 
system could learn from the better performance of this outlet. 
 
Customer feedback: Customers are asked how well their needs are served using 
quantitative customer ratings for example.180 This monitoring tool shows reasons for 
customer’s level of satisfaction and dissatisfactions and where might the 
opportunities for increasing the service level lie.181 
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B.2.2.1.1 Monitoring costs 
 
“This monitoring is costly, requiring owners to hire individuals to verify the behavior of 
agents, and to invest in systems, like computers, budgets, and procedures, that 
enhance the ability of principals to monitor agents.” 182 
 
Monitoring costs result from behavioural uncertainty due to misbehaviour of the 
network partners 183 (or outlet managers) because a lack of monitoring can lead the 
agent to opportunistically engage in it.184  
 
The most frequently cited driving factor for monitoring cost is geographic 
dispersion.185 “Large geographic distance induces high travelling costs of the 
franchisor's representatives who conduct direct observations, thus increasing 
information gap and uncertainty.” 186  
 
 
 
B.2.2.2 Incentives  
 
“The simplest way to motivate the franchisee is to give him a share of the profits of 
the franchise. Then he will work as hard as is efficient; any leisure he consumes will 
clearly be worth the true cost. Thus, we would expect the franchise contract to be 
written in such a way as to give the franchisee much of the profits in the operation.”187  
 
To give the franchisee a bigger share of profits in order to stimulate his motivation 
means to increase his residual income.188 This is possible with a lower royalty rate.189 
However, the problem with low royalty rates is that franchisors may neglect to 
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franchise outlets at low royalty rates because royalties also act as incentives for 
them.190 
 
 
 
C. Agency Theory and DR in Franchising Networks 
 
The following chapter discusses the relationship between decision rights and the 
agency theory by examining the theoretical background, the brand name value 
(which is an important factor for the threat of free-riding), the monitoring costs, 
incentive contracting, bonding, and the assignment to other theories. 
 
 
 
C.1 Brand name value and DR 
 
The value of the brand name derives from the fact that it transmits relevant and 
reliable information which would be costly to aquire otherwise.191  
As already mentioned, it is very important for the franchisor to preserve the brand 
name value192 via maintaining uniformity for products offered, building design, 
ambience, service, and price.193 To achieve this goal the franchisees have to meet 
the quality standards required for these features. Non maintaining uniformity leads to 
the risk of brand name loss.194 Brand name loss depends on customers sensitivity to 
the various quality standards which are affected by the frenchisees’ actions on these 
product attributes.195  
Here arises the threat of free-riding because franchisees could maximize their own 
profits via witholding efforts complied with the quality standards:196 ”For example, 
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franchisees may use lower-quality inputs or advertise less to reduce their costs but, 
in the process, lower brand name value. Franchisees may also alter their product 
offerings to better suit their local markets, or oppose the implementation of new 
production processes and new product offerings that they don't think will do well in 
their market even if the innovation benefits other stores in the chain. All these 
behaviors affect the extent of standardization in the chain and thus the value of 
operating under a common brand.” 197 
The basic control mechanism for alleviating this problem is the allocation of decision 
rights (the degree of the franchisees autonomy).198  
There exist two main factors on which the level of potential free- riding depends on: 
 
• the value of the brand name 
• spillover potential associated with consumer mobility199 
 
A strong brand name enables the franchisee to sell the franchise products at higher 
prices which makes free-riding on the brand name more attractive.200 The spill over 
potential (or externality effect)201  affects the tendency for free-riding insofar that if 
customers tend to consume across outlets, the costs for under-providing quality 
standards will be shared by all outlets notwithstanding the fact that its benefits only 
go to the single franchisee.202 On the other hand, if consumers tend to consume 
frequently in the very same outlet, sub-performance in quality would hit the future 
demand for that outlet, which is an adequate motivation for the franchisee to comply 
with good quality standards.203 
Lopez et al. (2011) and Azevedo (2009) argue that the franchisor could achieve the 
required standardization level across outlets by increasing the degree of control over 
decisions.204 For example the franchisor can indicate the real205 and formal decision 
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making authority in the franchisee’s manual by prescribing in detail the various tasks 
to be performed by the franchisees in each outlet.206   
 
Based to these assumptions the following Hypothesis is derived: 
 
H1: “The higher the value of the brand name of the franchise network , the higher the 
potential threat of franchisees’ free- riding and the lower  the residual decision rights 
allocated to them.” 
 
 
 
C.2 Monitoring costs and DR 
 
As noted above207 the main driving factors for monitoring costs are the environmental 
and behavioral uncertainty.208 Monitoring costs in turn influence the allocation of 
residual decision rights: 
 
Windsperger, Jell (2005) examined the relationship between residual income and 
decision rights in the Hungarian trucking industry where they argue that the higher 
the environmental uncertainty, the higher the degree of asymmetric information 
between the carrier and the driver and the more expensive the central control of a 
transportation, the more  should the residual decision rights be transferred to the 
driver.209     
In their study of banking industry in Texas, Brickley et al. (2003) argue that large 
banks should grant local managers significant decision-making authority if the costs 
of monitoring are high.210   
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Lafontaine et al. (1998) depict that higher behavior monitoring costs lead to more 
vertical separation (analogy for residual decision rights211).212 “This reflects the fact 
that when behavior monitoring is costly, firms rely on it less, and rely more on 
residual claims to compensate their agents.”213  
 
According to these assumptions the following hypothesis is derived: 
 
H2: ”The higher the behavioural uncertainty, the higher the monitoring costs, and the 
higher the residual decision rights allocated to the franchisees.” 
 
 
 
C.3 Royalties and DR 
 
Royalties have a two-folded impact: First they act as an incentive for franchisors to 
promote the system brand name.214  They also act as an incentive for the franchisees 
to provide service at the outlet level.215 This means that there is a trade-off between 
these two incentives provided by royalties: If the royalty rate is relatively high, the 
franchisor has a higher stake in franchising his outlets (i.e.: franchisors supply of 
franchised units increases), if the royalty rate his relatively low the franchisees have a 
higher stake in purchasing franchised outlets (i.e.: franchisees’ demand for 
franchised units increases).216 The problem of the franchisee with growing royalty 
rates is that they quickly eliminate his or her profit margins due to which willingness 
to undertake a franchised outlet decreases.217 
 
Another important point in this regard is that the degree of the royalties influences the 
nature of the franchising network: “…the higher the royalty rate, the more similar 
franchising becomes to company ownership and hence the smaller the advantages 
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of franchising over company ownership.” 218 The crucial question here is weather 
royalties evoke similarity to company ownership, or could they also be seen as an 
indicator for the fraction of the franchisees’ decision rights? In the case of company 
ownership (vertical integration), the agents regularly have less decision rights than in 
franchising because:” In particular, franchisees’ residual claim on the profits of their 
unit (net of royalty payments) induces greater effort than is provided by a company 
employee who receives mainly a fixed salary and who therefore seeks to minimize 
costs of effort.” 219  
 
The answer to this question was supported by Shane (1998) who found 
(contradictory to his hypothesis) a negative relationship between the royalty rate and 
the proportion of franchised outlets (vertical integration).220 Hence, the higher the 
royalty rate, the lower the degree of vertical separation and therefore the higher the 
grade of vertical integration (analogy for residual decision rights221).  
 
Rubin (1978) also goes in the same direction: 
“...where there are relatively few managerial decisions to be made, we would expect 
more of the income of the franchisor to come from royalties.” 222  The reverse of this 
expression is:  if the royalties are high, there would be fewer managerial decisions to 
be made.  
 
 
Analogical to this background the next hypothesis ends in: 
 
H3: “The higher the royalty rate the franchisees’ have to devote to the franchisor, the 
lower their residual decision rights.” 
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C.4 Other Theories: Relational Governance Perspective 
 
“Transaction costs, property rights and agency models can be enriched by research 
results from the relational governance perspective.” 223 
The relational governance perspective (e.g. Kaufman and Stern 1988; Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Gulati 1995; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Gulati and Nickerson 2008) 
characterises social interactions in the governance of channel structures (i.e. the 
coordination of vertical relationships), specifically the role of trust and relational 
norms.224 
Zaheer et al. (1998) define trust as the expectation that an actor 1) can be relied up 
on to fulfil promises 2) will behave a predictable manner, and 3) to act and negotiate 
fairly where the possibility for opportunism is present.225 Furthermore they distinguish 
between relational and dispositional trust, whereas dispositional trust reflects the 
individual assumptions about the trustworthiness of others in general, while relational 
trust pertains specifically to expectations of the counterpart in the network.226  
According to Windsperger (forthcoming) trust as a mechanism of relational 
governance could influence the franchisor’s allocation of decision rights because it 
reduces the relational risk and increases information sharing which in turn enables 
the franchisor to reduce formal control over operational decisions.227  
In their study about decision making authority López-Fernández and López-Bayón 
(2011) state that trust can serve as an “informal safeguard” that can assure 
franchisee performance.228 They found that the duration of previous franchise 
relationships is trust-building and favours the degree of decentralization.229   
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D. Empirical Study 
 
D.1. Introduction 
 
Part D is devoted to the the statistical analysis of the stated hypothesis. The empirical 
analysis is implemented based on the three parts A) Franchising B) Agency theory 
and Franchising and C) Agency theory in Franchising Networks. The first section 
provides information on the sample and data, measures and the variables used. The 
next section shows the results, the last section integrates the conclusion. 
 
 
 
D.1.1 Sample, Data and Survey instrument 
 
The data used comes from the Austrian, German and Swiss franchise sector and 
was obtained via an ad-hoc questionnaire about the ownership strategy of franchise 
companies in Germany. The questionnaire originally was developed for a study of 
Univ-. Prof. Dr. Josef Windsperger and Dildar Hussain. 
 
The questionnaire is comprised of 120 questions stated to the franchisors. The 
questionnaire is comprised of single choice (7 point Likert-type) and open questions 
and it takes an average of 20 – 25 minutes to complete it.  
 
 
 
D.1.2 Measures 
 
The questions include information on the investments of the franchisors and 
franchisees at the beginning and during the contractual relationship, advantages of 
multi-unit franchising compared with single-unit franchising, the importance of the 
brand name, relational and general trust, know-how, goal accomplishments in the last 
year, advantages of franchising, the contractual allocation of franchisees’ decision 
rights, the level of franchisees’ decision rights, behavioral and environmental 
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uncertainty, the number of company owned and franchised outlets, the age of the 
franchise system, the royalties and the training of franchisees. 
 
 
 
D.2 Variables 
 
D.2.1 Dependent variable: DR 
 
The dependent variable DR stands for the decision rights allocated to the 
franchisees.230 It is calculated from an index of 12 questions regarding the different 
areas of decision rights that are granted to the franchisees. The level of the particular 
decision right is subdivided into a scale from 1-7 (Likert-type), whereas 1 relates to 
“not at all” and 7 for “to a great extent.” The questions posed refer to the extent of 
decision making by the franchisees. 
 
1) Implementation of investment activities at the outlet level. 
2) Financing of investment projects at the outlet level. 
3) Selection of suppliers 
4) Hiring of employees at the outlet level 
5) Training of the employees at the outlet level 
6) Product / service offering in the local market 
7) Sales price at the outlet level 
8) Use of advertising and sales promotion 
9) Equipment at the franchised outlets 
10) Procurement of inputs 
11) Introduction of new products in the local market 
12) Use of accounting systems at the outlet level 
 
The reliability analysis of the questions regarding DR results in a Cronbach’s alpha 
value of 0,883. 
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D.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
Brand name value 
 
The variable BRANDNAME reflects the value of the brand name. It is used to 
measure weather the potential threat of free-riding that occurs with an augmenting 
brand name value231 could have a negative influence on franchisees’ decision rights. 
The variable contains the information of 4 questions regarding the value of the 
franchise systems’ brand. The questions posed (via 7 point Likert-type) to the 
franchisors for the variable BRANDNAME where:  
1) “Our brand name is very strong compared to our competitors.”  
2) “Our franchise system enjoys higher brand recognition compared to our 
competitors.”  
3) “Our franchise system enjoys a good reputation for quality.”  
4) “Our brand name is very important to achieve a competitive advantage.” 
 
The reliability analysis of the questions regarding the BRANDNAME results in a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0,815. 
 
 
 
Monitoring Costs 
 
MONCOST refers to the monitoring costs that rise with the uncertainty of the 
franchisees behavior232. The participating franchisors where asked 3 questions 
regarding the difficulty of: 
1) “Measuring the performance of the outlet manager (franchisee or manager).” 
2) “Controlling the behavior of the outlet manager (franchisees or managers).”  
3) “The assessment of the competencies and capabilities of the outlet manager 
(franchisee or manager).” 
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The franchisors could choose between 1 -7 grades for each particular question, 1 
relates to: “not at all” and 7 “to great extent”. 
 
The reliability analysis of the questions regarding PARTNERTRUST results in a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0,763 ( p>0,7). 
 
 
 
ROYALTIES 
 
The last independent variable ROYALTIES is the amount of payments in % of sales 
the franchisees devote to the franchisors. It is used to show the impact (a potential 
negative relationship) of the amount of royalties on the grade of decentralization of 
decision rights in franchising networks. 
 
 
 
D.2.3 Control Variables 
 
AGE 
 
AGE depicts the maturity of the franchise system. The franchisors where asked when 
the first franchised outlet was opened.  AGE is used to control the impact of the 
networks age that could influence the level of franchisees’ decision rights positive 
because of the effects of experience.233 
 
 
 
Sectoral effects 
 
SECTOR represents the differences of the two sectors of distribution franchising and 
service franchising. The franchisors had to answer which kind of franchising was 
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operated by their company. The possible answers where production, distribution, and 
service. Production franchising was not integrated into the variable because only 8 
out of 167 questioned franchisors claimed to operate production franchising. 
SECTOR measures a potential influence of the kind of franchising on the grade of 
decentralization of decision rights.234  A value of 0 refers to distribution franchising 
while 1 refers to service franchising. 
 
 
 
Relational Trust 
 
PARTNERTRUST measures the influence of the franchisors’ relational trust on DR. 
As already mentioned relational trust could lead to granting of more decision rights to 
the franchisees.235 Specifically, it refers to 4 questions regarding which kind of 
relationship the network partners have. The grade of relational trust was measured 
with a 1-7 Likert-type scale. The 4 questions posed to the franchisors were:  
 
1) “The cooperation is based on a partnership basis.” 
2) “The exchange of information between us and the partners goes beyond the 
agreed scope.” 
3) “There is great trust between ourselves and the partners.” 
4) “There is an atmosphere of openness and honesty between us and the 
partners.” 
 
The reliability analysis of the questions regarding PARTNERTRUST results in a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0,876( p>0,7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234
 cf. Windsperger (2004:1365) 
235
 cf. Zaheer et al. (1998:143) 
40 
 
General Trust 
 
In contrast to the variable PARTNERTRUST, the INITIALTRUST variable does not 
indicate the franchisors relational trust in the network partners, but their trust in 
people in general.236 INITIALTRUST is also an index of 4 questions whereas the 
grade was measured with a 1-7 scale. The 4 questions regarding general trust are:  
 
1) “We trust the people we have long relationship with.” 
2) “The majority of people trust others.” 
3) “Most people are trustworthy.” 
4) “Most people behave cooperatively if they are trusted.” 
 
The reliability analysis of the questions regarding INITIALTRUST results in a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0,761( p>0,7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
236
 cf. Zaheer et al. (1998) 
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D.3 Results 
 
D.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the franchise networks 
 
The franchisors from the Austrian, German and Swiss franchise sector sent back 167 
valid responses. The responses indicate that 4,8 % percent of the franchisors use 
production-, 28,1% distribution and 59,3 % service franchising. Table 1 shows the 
data regarding type of franchising. 
 
 Table 1: Type of franchising 
      
    Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Product franchising 8 4,8 5,2 5,2 
  Distribution 47 28,1 30,5 35,7 
  Service 99 59,3 64,3 100,0 
  Total 154 92,2 100,0   
Missing -9 13 7,8     
Total   167 100,0     
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
In average the responding franchise systems have 27 company owned- , and 109 
franchisee owned outlets. That is a total average of 136 outlets per network. The 
mean date of the first outlet opened is 1998. The franchise/entry fee amounts to € 
13.614,-  The average investment (excluding  franchise/entry fees) required by a 
franchisee to start a new outlet amounts to € 394.610,-  The variable royalties are in 
average 5,65 % of sales and the fixed advertising/marketing fee € 61,- per month. 
The average length of the franchise contract is 6,5 years.  The mean of initial training 
days a franchisee has to absolve to open an outlet amounts to 18,5 days yearly. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the respondent franchise networks. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the respondent franchise networks 
Attributes Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of company owned outlets 
in Germany/Swi/Aut in  2009 
 
27,50 
 
87,485 
 
0 
 
700 
Number of franchised outlet in 
Germany/Swi/Aut in 2009 
 
109,42 
 
279,726 
 
0 
 
2500 
Year when first franchised outlet 
was opened in Germany/Swi/Aut 
 
1998 
 
8,491 
 
1968 
 
2009 
Franchise/entry fee in Euro  
 
13614,65 
 
16597,326 
 
0 
 
120000 
Average investment (excluding 
franchise/entry fee) required by a 
franchisee to start a new 
franchised outlet (Euro) 
 
 
394610,87 
 
 
3274880,901 
 
 
100 
 
 
38500000 
Variable royalties (% of sales) 
 
5,6473 
 
7,92266 
 
,00 
 
50,00 
Fix advertising / marketing fee 
(Euros per month) 
 
61,03 
 
269,369 
 
0 
 
2300 
Franchise contract length in years 
 
6,69 
 
3,248 
 
1 
 
20 
 
Initial training days                             
 
 
18,52 
 
21,645 
 
0 
 
120 
 
 
 
D.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
 
This part provides the frequency analysis of the franchisors’ answers concerning the 
brand name, behavioral uncertainty, relational trust, general trust, and the decision 
rights allocated to the franchisees. 
 
 
 
D.3.2.1 Brand name 
 
The following graph 1 describes the frequency analysis of the variable 
BRANDNAME, which was built from the following 4 questions:  
1) “Our brand name is very strong compared to our competitors.”  
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2) “Our franchise system enjoys higher brand recognition compared to our 
competitors.”  
3) “Our franchise system enjoys a good reputation for quality.”  
4) “Our brand name is very important to achieve a competitive advantage.” 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Frequency analysis of BRANDNAME 
 
 
1) 7,9% of the franchisors believe that the brand name of their franchise system is 
very strong compared to their competitors, 38,2% are indifferent, and 53,9 % state 
that the brand name is not strong. 
2) Regarding the brand name recognition compared to the competitors 1,5% 
answered that they are more recognized than the competitors 27,9% are indifferent 
and 70,6 % define their system as less recognized. 
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3) 1,3% highly agree to the question indicating  a very high quality reputation 22,7% 
neither agree nor disagree and 76% disagree. 
4) 2,4% of the interviewees claim that the brand name is very important to achieve a 
competitive advantage, 10,7 % are indifferent, and 86,9  % disagree. 
 
 
 
D.3.2.2 Monitoring Costs 
 
The variable MONCOST is an index of 3 questions regarding behavioral uncertainty. 
The questions posed to the franchisors where: 
 
 1) “It is very difficult to measure the performance of the outlet manager (franchisee 
or manager).” 
 2)” It is very difficult to control the behavior of the outlet manager (franchisees or 
managers).”  
3)” It is very difficult to assess the competencies and capabilities of the outlet 
manager (franchisee or manager).” Graph 2 shows the frequency analysis of the 
answers concerning behavioral uncertainty. 
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Graph 2: Frequency analysis of MONCOST 
 
 
1) About 36,1% of the responding franchisors state “...that it is very difficult to 
measure the performance of the outlet manager”, 52,8% are indifferent, and 11,1% 
disagree. 
2) Around 15,7 % of the respondents claim that it is very difficult to control the 
behaviour of the outlet manager/franchisee, 68,6% neither agree or disagree, and 
15,7 % disagree. 
3) 14,0% agree with the statement that it is very difficult to assess the competencies 
and capabilities of the franchisees, 55,8 % are indifferent, and 30,2 % reject this 
statement. 
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D.3.2.3 Initial Trust 
 
The variable INITIALTRUST represents the general trust the franchisors have in 
people. INITIALTRUST is build based on the following 4 expressions: 
1) “We trust the people we have long relationship with.” 
2) “The majority of people trust others.” 
3) “Most people are trustworthy.” 
4) “Most people behave cooperatively if they are trusted.” 
 
Graph 3 shows the frequency analysis of the variable INITIALTRUST. 
 
 
 
Graph 3: INITIALTRUST 
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1) 4,5 % of the asked franchisors generally trust the people they have a long 
relationship with, 42,4 % are indifferent and 53,0 % disagree. 
2) Regarding the question that the majority of people trust others 17,0 % agree, 67,9 
% neither agree nor disagree and 15,1 % disagree. 
3) About 9,2 % think that “most people are trustworthy”, 72,3 % are indifferent and 
18,5 % reject this statement. 
4) Around 9,8% agree to ”most people are cooperative if they are trusted”, 56,9% are 
neutral, and 33,3% disagree to the question. 
 
 
 
D.3.2.4 Partner Trust 
 
In contrast to INITIALTRUST the variable PARTNERTRUST does not represent the 
trust of the franchisors in general but in their network partners (franchisees). 
PARTNERTRUST integrates 4 questions: 
1) “The cooperation is based on a partnership basis.” 
2) “The exchange of information between us and the partners goes beyond the 
agreed scope.” 
3) “There is great trust between us and the partners.” 
4) “There is an atmosphere of openness and honesty between us and the partners.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Graph 5: PARTNERTRUST 
 
1) Concerning the question regarding a partnership basis 2,2% of the participants 
agree while 13,5% are neutral and 84,3% disagree. 
2) 4,3% of the information exchange goes beyond the agreed scope, 37,7% are 
neutral, and 58,0% deny. 
3) Only 5% of the franchisors state that there is great trust between them and the 
partners, 16,7% neither agree nor disagree, and 78,3 state that they disagree. 
4) About 2,8% of the franchisors claim that there is an open atmosphere between 
them and the partners, 19,7% are neutral and 77,5% disagree. 
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D.3.2.5 Decision Rights 
 
The variable DR is an index consisting of 12 questions regarding the extent to wich 
the franchisees can decide in the following domains: 
 
1) Implementation of investment activities at the outlet level. 
2) Financing of investment projects at the outlet level. 
3) Selection of suppliers 
4) Hiring of employees at the outlet level 
5) Training of the employees at the outlet level 
6) Product / service offering in the local market 
7) Sales price at the outlet level 
8) Use of advertising and sales promotion 
9) Equipment at the franchised outlets 
10) Procurement of inputs 
11) Introduction of new products in the local market 
12) Usage of accounting systems at the outlet level 
 
Graph 6 describes the frequency analysis of the answers for the independent 
variable decision rights (DR). 
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Graph 6: Decision Rights 
 
 
1) Around 63,2% of the franchisees decide to great extent about the implementation 
of investment activities while 23,0% decide partially, and 13,8% do not. 
2) In financing of investment projects 62,6% can decide to great extent, 23,2% 
partially, and 14,1% not. 
3) About 33,3% of them can select their suppliers to great extent, 48,3% partially, and 
18,4 can’t decide at this point. 
4) An amount of 84,3% can decide over the hiring of employees at the outlet level, 
6,5% partially, and 9,3% not. 
5) 68% of the network partners can decide about the training of their employees 
completely, while 24,1% partially decide and 7,2% not. 
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6) The product and service offering at the local market is decided to great extent by 
around 49,3% of the franchisees, 36,0% of them can decide partially and 14,7% are 
not allowed to make decisions. 
7) 61,0% decide over the sales price at the outlet level, 27,3% partially, and 11,7 do 
not. 
8) About 56,3% of the franchisees can decide about their advertising and sales 
promotion, 36,6% just partially decide, and 7,0% not. 
9) Equipment at the franchised outlets: 48,6% to great extent, 31,1% partially, 20,3% 
not. 
10) The procurement of inputs is decided to 45,5% from the franchisees, 35,2% just 
partially decide, and 19,3% do not decide. 
11) New products in the local market are introduced to great extent by around 39,5% 
of the franchisees, partially by 40,7%, and not by 19,8% 
12) In the usage of accounting systems at the outlet level 45,3% of the franchisees 
are allowed to decide while 33,3% partly decide and 21,3% do not decide. 
 
 
 
D.4 Regression Analysis 
 
This chapter provides first the correlations and then the regression analysis in three 
steps: 
 
1) Regression analysis with only the control variables SECTOR and AGE 
2) Regression analysis with the control variables SECTOR, AGE, INITIALTRUST, 
PARTNERTRUST 
3) Regression analysis with all variables 
 
The following hypotheses are tested:  
 
Hypothesis 1: “The higher the value of the brand name of the franchise network , the 
higher the potential threat of franchisees’ free- riding and the lower  the residual 
decision rights allocated to them.” 
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Hypothesis 2: “The higher the behavioural uncertainty, the higher the monitoring 
costs, and the higher the residual decision rights allocated to the franchisees.”  
 
Hypothesis 3: “The higher the royalty rate the franchisees’ have to devote to the 
franchisor, the lower their residual decision rights.” 
 
To examine the hypotheses a linear regression analysis is conducted. The 
dependent variable DR is interpreted with help of the independent variables, 
BRANDNAME, MONCOST, ROYALTIES, and the control variables AGE, SECTOR, 
INITIALTRUST, and PARTNERTRUST. The dependent variable DR is the grade of 
decision rights allocated to the franchisees, BRANDNAME reflects the value of the 
networks brand, MONCOST shows the difficulty to observe the franchisees’ behavior, 
ROYALTIES describes the amount of fees the franchisees’ devote in percent. The 
variable AGE is used to integrate the duration of the age of the franchise system, 
SECTOR the franchise sector, the additional control variables INITIALTRUST and 
PARTNERTRUST enrich the model with the relational governance theory and reflect 
the general and relational trust of the franchisors. 
 
The regression equation reads as follows: 
DR= α0 +  α1BRANDNAME +  α2MONCOST + α3ROYALTIES +  α4INITIALTRUST + 
 α5PARTNERTRUST +  α6AGE + α7INITIALTRUST +  α8SECTOR  
 
Based on the 3 hypothesis the variable BRANDNAME should be negatively 
correlated with DR reflecting the fact that a valuable brand name decreases the 
franchisees’ decision rights while MONCOST should have a positive predictor, 
indicating that with a rising difficulty to observe the franchisees behavior the 
decisions rights of them also rise. The variable ROYALTIES should decrease with the 
use of DR, thus it should have a negative predictor. The control variable AGE should 
have a positive influence on DR. The variable SECTOR represents the differences of 
the franchise sectors distribution and service. In the distribution sector the 
franchisees may have less decision rights than in the service sector. For SECTOR 
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the value of the distribution sector is 0, and for the service sector 1. Thus the 
tendency towards service franchising should be positively correlated with decision 
rights and a positive predictor of the variable SECTOR is expected. The additional 
control variables INITIALTRUST and PARTNERTRUST lent from the relational 
governance theory also should have positive predictors, reflecting the positive 
influence of trust on the decision rights of franchisees. 
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D.4.1 Results 
 
D.4.1.1 Correlations 
 
Table 3 shows the correlations of all variables with each other. The variable 
BRANDNAME correlates (positively) significantly with DR, and also highly significant 
with PARTNERTRUST which could indicate coherence between the value of the 
brand name and the trust in the network. MONCOST also correlates with DR highly 
significant. INITIALTRUST is highly correlated with MONCOST and INITIALTRUST. 
The control variable SECTOR is significantly correlated with the variable ROYALTIES 
which could be a sign for differing grades of royalties (in % of sales) in the franchise 
sectors of distribution and service. 
 
Table 3: Correlations 
 
DR 
Brand- 
Name 
MON-
COST Royalties 
Partner- 
Trust 
Initial- 
Trust Age 
SECT 
0=Sales, 
1=Service 
DR 1        
BrandName ,167* 1       
MONCOST ,264** ,080 1      
ROYALTIES -,131 -,007 -,082 1     
PartnerTrust ,348** ,411** -,011 ,042 1    
InitialTrust ,026 ,100 -,221** -,023 ,234** 1   
Age ,049 ,148 ,139 -,105 ,101 -,040 1  
SECTOR  -,045 -,083 ,103 ,204** ,004 ,098 -,121 1 
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D.4.1.2 Regression with Control Variables  
 
Table 4 shows the model summary of the regression analysis of DR including only 
the control variables SECTOR and AGE. The value of R square amounts to 0,010 
which indicates that 1% of the variance of the regression model can be explained. 
 
Table 4: Model Summary 1 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,100a ,010 -,004 1,27283 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SECTOR, Age 
 
Table 5 contains the anova of the regression with the control variables. The 
significance level amounts to 0,496, the F value to 0,705 
 
 
Table 5: Anova 1 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2,285 2 1,142 ,705 ,496a 
Residual 226,814 140 1,620   
Total 229,099 142    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SECTOR, Age 
b. Dependent Variable: DR 
 
 
Table 6 shows the coefficients of the control variables: the variable AGE has a 
positive coefficient and the significance level is 0,643, the predictor of the variable 
SECTOR is negative and the significance level amounts to 0,303. 
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Table 6: Coefficients 1 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,007 ,231  21,652 ,000 
Age ,006 ,013 ,039 ,465 ,643 
SECTOR -,232 ,225 -,087 -1,033 ,303 
a. Dependent Variable: DR 
 
 
 
D.4.1.3 Regression with Control Variables and Trust Variables 
 
Table 7 displays the model summary of the regression analysis with the variables 
AGE, SECTOR, INITIALTRUST, and PARTNERTRUST. Now R square has 
increased to  the value of 0,93 hence, 9,3% of the regression model with the control 
variables and the trust variables can be explained.  
 
Table 7: Model Summary 2 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,304a ,093 ,066 1,22742 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SECTOR, PartnerTrust, Age, InitialTrust 
 
 
The next tab shows the anova of the regression with the 4 control variables. Now the 
significance level has a value of 0,009 which shows that this model is more 
significant than the model with only the two variables SECTOR and AGE (0,496). 
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Table 8: Anova 2 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 21,194 4 5,299 3,517 ,009a 
Residual 207,905 138 1,507   
Total 229,099 142    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SECTOR, PartnerTrust, Age, InitialTrust 
b. Dependent Variable: DR 
 
 
Table 9 shows that PARTNERTRUST is highly significant (0,001) and has a positive 
coefficient while INITIALTRUST is not significant and has a negative coefficient. The 
significance level of AGE is lower (0,951) compared with the first model (0,643). The 
significance of the variable SECTOR (0,339) is almost the same than in the first 
mode (0,303). 
 
Table 9: Coefficients 2 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3,437 ,692  4,968 ,000 
PartnerTrust ,353 ,101 ,289 3,506 ,001 
InitialTrust -,093 ,092 -,084 -1,017 ,311 
Age ,001 ,012 ,005 ,062 ,951 
SECTOR -,209 ,218 -,079 -,960 ,339 
a. Dependent Variable: DR 
 
 
 
D.4.1.4 Regression with all Variables 
 
The following table 10 shows the model summary of all integrated variables. Now the 
R square lies at 0,214, indicating that 21,4% of  the final models’ variance can be 
defined. 
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Table 10 : Model Summary 3 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,463a ,214 ,170 1,11853 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SECTOR , PartnerTrust, MONCOST, Age,  
ROYALTIES (% of sales), InitialTrust, Brandname 
 
 
The next anova (table 11) displays a significance level of 0,00  of the final regression 
model. The F- value has increased to 4,794 compared to the first (0,703) and the 
second regression (3,517) model. 
 
Table 11: Anova 3 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 41,988 7 5,998 4,794 ,000a 
Residual 153,887 123 1,251   
Total 195,876 130    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SECTOR, PartnerTrust, MONCOST, Age,  ROYALTIES (% of sales), 
InitialTrust, Brandname 
b. Dependent Variable: DR 
 
 
 
The final table 12 shows the coefficients of the whole regression model, integrating 
all variables. The accordant histogram of the regression standardized 
residual/frequency and the p-plot of the expected cum prob. / observed cum prob. are 
attached in appendix C. 
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Table 12: Coefficients 3 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,878 ,844  2,224 ,028 
Brandname -,010 ,099 -,009 -,097 ,923 
MONCOST ,318 ,083 ,330 3,848 ,000 
ROYALTIES (% of sales) -,015 ,012 -,097 -1,178 ,241 
PartnerTrust ,353 ,101 ,305 3,480 ,001 
InitialTrust ,024 ,090 ,023 ,271 ,787 
AGE ,004 ,013 ,026 ,315 ,753 
SECTOR -,208 ,216 -,080 -,965 ,336 
a. Dependent Variable: DR 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: “The higher the value of the brand name of the franchise network, the 
higher the potential threat of franchisees’ free- riding, and the lower the residual 
decision rights allocated to them.” 
 
The variable BRANDNAME has a negative coefficient and a significance level of 
0,923. The variable represents the value of the franchise networks’ brand name.  The 
negative coefficient of the variable was predicted but the significance is far above 
p>0,05. Thus, the hypothesis that the value of the brand name influences the 
decision rights of the franchisees negatively is not supported. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: “The higher the behavioural uncertainty the higher the monitoring 
costs, the higher the residual decision rights allocated to the franchisees.”  
 
The prefix of the variable MONCOST is positive and the significance value amounts 
to 0,000. The predicted positive relationship to the independent variable DR and the 
high significance level support the second hypothesis, the higher the monitoring 
costs the higher the franchisees’ decision rights. 
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Hypothesis 3: “The higher the royalty rate the franchisees’ have to devote to the 
franchisor, the lower their residual decision rights.” 
 
The B value of the variable ROYALTIES in table 12 shows a negative coefficient and 
the significance value shows 0,241. The negative coefficient was predicted, but the 
value of 0,241 is above 0,05. That means the third hypothesis that the variable 
ROYALTIES have a negative effect on DR could not be confirmed. 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
As predicted, the variable PATNERTRUST is positively related to the independent 
variable. The high significance value of 0,01 indicates that trust between the  
partners in franchising networks influences the decision rights allocated to 
franchisees’ positively. 
 
The variable INITIALTRUST is positively related to DR, the significance level is 
0,784(not significant). 
 
The control variable AGE has a positive coefficient and is not significant (Sig = 
0,753). 
 
The last control variable, SECTOR has a negative coefficient, but with the value of 
0,336 it is not significant. 
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D.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The intention of this thesis was to examine the decision rights allocated to 
franchisees in franchise systems from an agency-theoretical point of view. 
Specifically, the topics of free-riding, the role of monitoring costs, and the influence of 
royalties where studied. The instruments in the empirical part used for that purpose 
where the brand name value, behavioral uncertainty of the franchisee , and the 
amount of the variable royalties in % of sales. These instruments where compared 
with the amount of decision rights allocated to the franchisees. In addition to that, a 
gaze on the role of trust, lent from the relational governance theory has been taken.  
The empirical study was able to prove a positive relationship between monitoring 
costs and franchisees’ decision rights. It failed however to support the hypotheses of 
a negative relationship between royalties and franchisees’ decision rights and the 
negative relationship of the threat of free-riding and the decentralization of decision 
rights. Additionally, an interesting and incidental finding was the positive correlation of 
the relational trust between the network partners and the grade of decision rights 
granted to the franchisees.  
 
A reason why the study has failed to prove a negative relationship between the brand 
name value and franchisee’s decision rights could be that franchisors of high-value 
networks seek to avoid to signal a lack of trust in their network partners. Following 
Kidwell (2006) this lack of trust enhances the threat of free-riding because the 
franchisees tend to misbehave in a climate of low trust.237 
The failure to prove the positive relationship between royalties and franchisees’ 
decision rights shows that there is probably no coherence between centralization of 
decision rights and the assumption that higher royalties evoke similarity to company 
ownership238. This could reflect that franchisees stay entrepreneurs eager how high 
their royalty payments are. 
 
Managerial implications are: 1) That in an environment of high behavioral uncertainty 
it is better to grant franchisees more decision rights in order to reduce monitoring 
                                                 
237
 Kidwell et al. (2007:527). 
238
 Lafontaine et al. (1992:274) 
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expenditures, respective: agency costs. 2) Franchisors should provide a climate of 
trust between the partners in the network because if they can trust the franchisee 
they can decentralize the decision making authority and avoid agency costs. 
 
This paper is limited by the fact that agency theory only provides a narrow view of 
franchisees’ decision rights. The exclusive usage of this theory is not sufficient to 
examine an extremely diversified topic (such as the allocation of decision rights in 
franchising networks) which is influenced by a variety of different factors. 
 
Future research questions could focus on an interaction between environmental and 
behavioral uncertainty compared with decision rights and determing factors on 
decision rights that also should be considered like the performance of the franchising 
network and the role of trust (relational governance perspective). 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Abstract in German 
 
 
Laut Michael (1996:57) übernehmen Franchisenehmer üblicherweise 
Entscheidungsrechte auf der operative Ebene wie Öffnungszeiten, Preise und die 
Örtlichkeit der Geschäftslokale, weil sie das spezifische Know-how dafür haben. 
Weiters entscheiden Franchisegeber meistens über strategische Belange wie 
Produkt, Produktion und gemeinsames Marketing um eine Vereinheitlichung 
herzustellen, die wiederum den Markennahmen des Franchise-Netzwerkes 
gewährleistet. Die Verteilung dieser Entscheidungsrechte divergiert allerdings 
graduell und auch inhaltlich stark zwischen den verschiedenen Franchise-
Netzwerken. Obwohl bei der Betrachtung von Franchising  die Agency Theorie 
wahrscheinlich vorherrschend ist, hat sie in der Literatur die Verteilung von 
Entscheidungsrechten selten im Fokus. Diese Studie beleuchtet die Verteilung der 
einzelnen Entscheidungsrechte der Franchisenehmer aus Agency Theoretischer 
Sicht.   
Dazu werden die Gefahr von Free-riding, die Monitoringkosten und die an den 
Franchisegeber zu bezahlenden Royalties  aus dieser Sichtweise betrachtet.  
Zunächst werden in Teil A allgemeine Thematiken im Zusammenhang mit 
Franchising und Entscheidungsrechten erörtert. Die Aufgabe von Teil B ist es 
Franchising allgemein aus und die Agency Sicht zu betrachten. Teil C beinhaltet die 
Agency Sichtweise auf Entscheidungsrechte in Franchise-Systemen. Spezifisch 
wird die Wichtigkeit des Markennamens, die Höhe der Royalties und die 
Verhaltensunsicherheit veranschaulicht, was in der Aufstellung von 3 Hypothesen 
endet. Der empirische Teil wertet die aufgestellten Hypothesen mithilfe von Daten 
aus dem deutschen, österreichischen und schweizer Franchise-Sektor statistisch 
aus. 
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